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Abstract
This paper focuses on the coordination problem among borrow-
ing countries imposing controls on capital inflows. In a simple model
of capital flows and controls, we show that inflow restrictions dis-
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such capital flow deflection may lead to a policy response. We then
test the theory using data on inflow restrictions and gross capital
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1 Introduction
What type of multilateral institutions do countries need to govern international
capital flows? As the size and volatility of capital flows, namely to developing coun-
tries, have largely increased in recent years (Figure 1), this question has raised the
interest of both academic economists and policymakers. The ensuing debate has led
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to review its position on the liberalization and
management of capital flows and to provide a set of recommendations to help countries
deal with these flows. Part of this new institutional view is the emphasis on the need
for international agreements to coordinate or set the appropriate standards for policy
intervention. However, as recognized by the IMF, “much further work remains to be
done to improve policy coordination in the financial sector” (IMF, 2012, page 28).
Figure 1: Gross Inflows (% GDP) to Developing Countries by Region
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The trade policy literature can be useful to macroeconomists interested in inter-
national policy coordination. This literature has shown that multilateral institutions
are effective when they provide a framework to address relevant cross-border spillovers
related to countries’ unilateral policies. In particular, Bagwell and Staiger (1999 and
2002) have shown that the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), have effectively improved interna-
tional trade cooperation because they allow countries to neutralize a relevant trade
policy externality, the (intra-temporal) terms-of-trade effect. Similarly, understanding
what are the relevant spillovers associated with the use of capital controls is an essential
building block to improving multilateral cooperation in the financial sector.
This paper reviews the coordination problem among borrowing countries that have
at their disposal capital controls as the instrument to manage capital inflows.1 In the
1Capital controls encompass a variety of measures, such as taxes, quantitative restrictions and
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spirit of the trade policy literature, we present a simple framework to identify a cross-
border spillover associated with capital controls and then empirically test the relevance
of this effect. Our key insight is that, just like tariffs in an importing country can deflect
exports to other markets and may induce a policy response by affected importers (Bown
and Crowley, 2006 and 2007), capital controls induce capital flow deflection and lead
to policy response by affected borrowers.2
Figure 2 provides preliminary motivating evidence for our work. It shows the gross
capital inflows (as a share of GDP) to South Africa and the inflow controls imposed by
Brazil in a period where capital controls in South Africa were essentially stable. Inflow
restrictions in Brazil appear to be associated to a surge in capital flows to South Africa
in 1996-1997 and in 2008-2009. Two recent event studies focusing on Brazil (Forbes et
al. 2013; and Lambert et al. 2011) provide further motivating evidence. In particular,
Forbes et al. (2013) find that more stringent capital controls set by Brazil between
2006 and 2011, such as the introduction of a 2 percent tax on portfolio equity and debt
inflows in 2009, have led investors to increase the share of their portfolios allocated to
other countries, including Indonesia, Korea, Peru and Thailand. And interestingly, all
these countries have imposed measures designed to limit capital inflows in 2010-11.3
To examine the problem of policy coordination among recipient countries and to
guide our empirical analysis, we build a parsimonious model based on work by Korinek
(2014). In this setting, governments have two main reasons for influencing capital
flows. A first rationale comes from the desire to manipulate the inter-temporal terms-
of-trade in their favor as discussed in Costinot et al. (2013). A large country setting
capital controls takes into account that its policy choice affects the world interest rate
and finds it unilaterally efficient to exploit this market power. The second motive
for capital controls is to manipulate the domestic interest rate to address domestic
distortions, such as financial fragility.4 We refer to the latter as the prudential motive
regulations, that affect cross-border financial activities by discriminating on the basis of residency
(IMF, 2013).
2The term “trade deflection” was introduced in Bown and Crowley (2006) to indicate a situation
where an increase in a trade barrier in one market determines a change in destination in exports. This
is different from the concept of “trade diversion”(Viner, 1950), where the reduction of a tariff granted
to a trading partner increases imports from the latter and reduces imports from other (potentially
more efficient) exporters. An example of trade deflection discussed in Bown and Crowley (2007) is the
steel safeguard, a set of tariffs and quotas, imposed by the US on Chinese exports in 2002. Shortly
afterwards, the EU reacted with similar measures, claiming that the change in US policy had deflected
Chinese steel exports to its market.
3In 2010, Peru increased the fee on non-resident purchase of central bank paper to 400 basis points
(from 10 basis points), while Thailand imposed a 15 percent withholding tax on non-residents’ interest
earnings and capital gains on state bonds. In 2011, Indonesia introduced a limit on short-term foreign
borrowing by banks to 30 percent of capital and Korea restored a 14 percent withholding tax on
interest income on non-resident purchases of treasury bonds (IMF, 2013).
4In the words of Keynes (1943), “the whole management of the domestic economy depends upon
being free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the rates prevailing elsewhere
in the world. Capital control is a corollary to this.”
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Figure 2: Brazil’s Controls and South Africa’s Flows
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Note: The left vertical axis provides the scale for gross inflows as share of GDP. The right
vertical axis provides the scale for inflow controls as measured by Schindler (2009).
(as it is often called in the literature), while the first is the terms-of-trade motive. Note
that while this model is parsimonious and does not explicitly account for other uses of
capital controls, such as targeting the real exchange rate or preserving monetary policy
independence (i.e. dealing with the “trilemma”), it captures their essential rationales:
capital controls either aim at altering the world interest rate, or the domestic interest
rate, or both.
In this context, we formally investigate the causes and consequences of capital flow
deflection. Inflow restrictions imposed by a large country, or a sufficiently large set of
small countries, lower the world interest rate, as they subtract demand for capital from
the world market. This change in the world interest rate leads to higher borrowing
by recipient countries that have not altered their capital controls. The cross-border
policy spillover effect among borrowers is what we refer to as capital flow deflection.
It is insightful to look at this effect of capital controls from the perspective of foreign
investors. For them all borrowing countries are identical (by assumption), except for
capital controls. As international investors perceive a lower return of exporting capital
to countries that tightened capital controls, they reallocate their capital to the other
borrowers. This insight plays an important role in our empirical strategy.
Capital flow deflection, in turn, induces a policy response by borrowers. Importantly,
while the spillover effect is independent of the underlying rationale for capital controls,
this is not the case for the policy response. Specifically, capital flow deflection has an
ambiguous impact on the terms-of-trade motive for capital controls. Intuitively, the
incentive to manipulate the international interest rate with capital controls depends on
the elasticity of global savings faced by the country. On the other hand, the prudential
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motive for capital controls is strengthened by capital flow deflection. The higher inflows
exacerbate domestic distortions and increase the incentive to manipulate the domestic
interest rate with capital controls to offset them. This result has an interesting corollary.
If the primary motive for capital controls is to manipulate the domestic interest rate, as
for prudential controls, then uncoordinated inflow restrictions can magnify exogenous
shocks, such as a sudden increase in global liquidity. Intuitively, with capital flow
deflection, inflow restrictions are complementary policies, so that a shock initiates a
chain reaction and leads to a multiplier effect.5
In the empirical investigation, we use a dynamic panel model to estimate the impact
of capital controls on inflows to other countries and on the policy response. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates these issues in a cross-sectional study.
There is a well known literature on the push and pull factors that determine capital flows
(e.g. Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Ghosh et al. 2013), but these studies generally abstract
from the role of capital controls by third countries. Two exceptions, as discussed above,
are the event study approach by Forbes et al. (2013) and Lambert et al. (2011) that
find evidence of capital flow deflection spurring from the policies implemented in Brazil
between 2006 and 2011. Finally, a small recent literature examines the factors that
cause policymakers to change capital controls (Fratzscher, 2012; Fernandez et al. 2013).
These studies, however, disregard the policy response to the capital controls imposed
by other borrowers.
We use data on gross capital inflows for a large sample of developing countries
between 1995 and 2009 and use the so called Schindler index (Schindler, 2009) which
allows us to identify the capital controls aiming at restricting inflows. To test the model,
we divide countries into groups of likely substitutes based on common characteristics,
such as geographic location, export specialization, return and risk. This is an important
step, as the model features symmetric countries and, therefore, abstracts from the
multiple features of cross-country heterogeneity that may influence investors’ decisions
in practice. In the first set of regressions, we introduce a variable capturing the level
of capital controls in the rest of the group in an otherwise standard push-pull analysis.
In the second set of regressions, we use a probit model to estimate the probability
that capital controls by some countries may trigger a reaction in a country of the same
group.
We find strong evidence of a capital flow deflection. The spillover effect of inflow
restrictions is estimated to be strong and significant among borrowing countries that
have similar risk level. Perhaps surprisingly, we find no significant spillover effects on
countries in the same region. This finding is consistent with the view that investors
are guided by the similary economic characteristics of countries, rather than their geo-
graphic location -a result that confirms in a cross-section the evidence of existing event
studies. Capital flow deflection is also found to be economically relevant. While some-
5Similar arguments have been informally made by others. In particular, Ostry et al. (2012) and
Korinek (2014) talk of the possibility of a “capital control arms race”.
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how an extreme case, we estimate that gross inflows to South Africa as a share of GDP
would have been between 0.5 and 1.0 percent lower if Brazil had not imposed higher
inflow restrictions in 2009. Finally, these results are robust to a number of tests. In
particular, spillovers to countries with similar economic characteristics continue to be
significant when we use different measures of capital controls or risk, when we focus on
episodes of capital flow surges and when we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach
to address endogeneity problems.
Notwithstanding the strength of capital flow deflection, we find no evidence of a
policy response. This result is independent of how we group countries and persists even
if we focus on small economies, which have no terms-of-trade motives to set capital
controls. We see three possible explanations for this somewhat puzzling result. The
first has to do with the nature of the data on capital controls. The Schindler index,
as the other available measures of capital controls, do not record a change in intensity
of a measure (say, an increase in the tax on capital inflows from 2% to 4%), but only
whether the measure is in place or not. To the extent that countries react to capital
flow deflection by toughening the existing policies rather than creating new ones, the
empirical findings would be biased against a policy response. The second reason has
to do with the model we use to guide our empirical analysis. As discussed in a large
literature following the seminal work of Bartolini and Drazen (1997), capital controls
can work as a signal to markets in presence of uncertainty over the government type. If
policymakers anticipate this, they may be more reluctant to use capital controls in the
short run in fear that investors will interpret them as a change in the course of future
policies.6 In this case, a policy response can be muted even in presence of capital flow
deflection. Finally, a third explanation is that prudential controls are less relevant in
practice than the theory seems to suggest. This may be either because governments
resort to instruments other than inflow restrictions to deal with capital flow deflection
or because there are situations where this deflection can have a positive impact, such
as when borrowing countries have difficulties accessing international financial markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple general
equilibrium model of capital flows and establishes the two main results on capital flow
deflection. Section 3 brings these two predictions to the data. We first provide evi-
dence of the cross-border spillover effect of capital controls and then we focus on the
policy reaction to inflow restrictions. Concluding remarks and policy implications are
in Section 4. The proofs and a detailed data description are in the technical Appendix.
6Some may see this argument as contradicting the notion that capital controls can be a legitimate
(even if second-best) instrument to address a domestic distortion. This idea, however, has only recently
become widely accepted (for instance, the institutional view of the IMF on capital flow management was
published in 2012), while our dataset covers the period 1995-2009. An interesting question is, therefore,
whether in the future a policy response to capital flow deflection will become a more permanent feature
of the international financial system.
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2 A Two-Period Model of Capital Controls
In this section we introduce the simplest model of international capital flows. In
a multi-country world lasting two periods (t = 1, 2), economic agents face a standard
intertemporal consumption decision problem. There is a single homogeneous good
that is tradable across boarders and an intentional bond denominated in the tradable
good allows consumers to shift consumption across the two periods. Each country can
introduce capital controls to affect consumers’ decisions.
The model is a further simplified version of the framework presented in Korinek
(2014). Even this, admittedly highly stylized, theoretical framework is however suffi-
cient to identify the two effects that we are interested in, and that will later be investi-
gated empirically: (i) the capital flow deflection, whereby a borrowing country raising
its capital controls leads to higher capital inflows to other borrowing countries; (ii) the
policy response, whereby a borrowing country alters its capital controls in response to
a change in controls by other borrowers. We start by introducing the characteristics of
a generic country i.
2.1 Economic Structure of Country i
Country i is populated by a unit mass of identical consumers who earn yit at time t
and value consumption cit according to the following utility function:
U i(ci1, c
i
2) = u(c
i
1) + β
iu(ci2) + e(C
i
1 − Y i1 ), (1)
with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and βi < 1, and where Ci1 and Y
i
1 denote, respectively, aggregate
consumption and income in country i at time 1, which are both taken as exogenous
by the individual. Country i is defined as borrower (lender) whenever Ci1 − Y i1 > 0
(Ci1 − Y i1 < 0). Function e(·) captures the fact that capital inflows may be associated
with negative external effects, such as the risk that results from domestic households
ignoring the consequences of their foreign borrowing decisions on the country’s financial
stability (financial fragility). Specifically, this externality is defined as
e(Ci1 − Y i1 ) ≡
{ −x(Ci1 − Y i1 ) when Ci1 − Y i1 > 0
0 when Ci1 − Y i1 ≤ 0,
where x(·) is a positive twice continuously differentiable function with x′(·), x′′(·) > 0.7
If a country is a lender (Ci1 − Y i1 ≤ 0), the externality is null. If instead a country is a
borrower (Ci1−Y i1 > 0), the externality associated with capital inflows enters individual
welfare function.
7The convexity of the externality function is a common assumption in the literature. In the context
of financial fragility, convexity is justified by the fact that the risk to a country’s financial stability is
likely to increase at a faster rate as foreign borrowing rises.
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Consumers must satisfy the following intertemporal budget constraint:
(ci1 − yi1)(1 + τ i)R = yi2 − ci2 + T i, (2)
where R ≡ 1 + r is the world gross real interest rate, and τ i is a tax/subsidy on
individual borrowing at time 1. In the context of a representative agent economy, τ i
can also be interpreted as the capital control policy at time 1. A positive τ i denotes a
capital inflow tax when the country is a borrower, and a capital outflow subsidy when
the country is a lender; and a negative τ i has the opposite interpretation. In the rest
of the paper, we simply refer to τ i as capital controls. The tax revenue when τ i > 0
(or the cost of the subsidy when τ i < 0) is assumed to be lump-sum rebated to (or
financed from) consumers, so that T i = (Ci1 − Y i1 )τ iR.
In each country i, the representative consumer maximizes her objective function (1)
while satisfying the budget constraint (2), and taking the world interest rate R, the
policy τ i as well as the aggregate variables as given. Maximization gives rise to the
usual Euler Equation:
u′(ci1) = β
iRu′(ci2)(1 + τ
i), (3)
implying consumption demands ci1(
−
R,
−
τ i) and ci2(
+
R,
+
τ i). Assuming substitution effect
dominates income effect, a higher interest rate implies higher savings (ci1 ↓, ci2 ↑), and
hence a fall in the demand of capital inflows in borrowing countries and a surge in the
supply of capital outflows in lending countries. On the other hand, a country i that
raises its capital controls (τ i ↑) creates a wedge between the world interest rate and the
domestic interest rate (Ri = R(1 + τ i)), thus stimulating domestic savings (ci1 ↓, ci2 ↑)
and, hence, reducing its demand of capital inflows.
2.2 Optimal Capital Controls
For a world economy made up of n countries we now characterize the optimal capital
control policy of each individual country i and the resulting world market equilibrium.
The mass of country i is denoted by mi ∈ [0, 1], with ∑ni=1mi = 1. Hence, mi = 0
implies that country i is small with respect to the world economy. Whether country i
is large or small, its national planner maximizes the following social welfare function:
W i(ci1, c
i
2) = u(c
i
1) + β
iu(ci2) + e(c
i
1 − yi1), (4)
subject to the budget constraint
ci1 − yi1 =
(yi2 − ci2)
R
. (5)
The crucial difference between the individual’s and the social planner’s optimization
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problem is that the latter internalizes the aggregate impact of individual consumption
plans on capital inflows to country i. The socially optimal consumption plans for
country i are implicitly determined by the following Euler equation:
u′(ci1)− βiRu′(ci2)− x′(ci1 − yi1)− βiu′(ci2)(ci1 − yi1)
dR
d[mi(ci1 − yi1)]
= 0. (6)
A comparison of the two Euler equations (3) and (6) shows that there are two
reasons for policy intervention in this economy. A first reason results from the presence
of a domestic externality. The government may restrict capital inflows as a means to
manipulate the domestic interest rate (Ri = R(1 + τ i)), thus affecting agents’ saving
patterns and offsetting this distortion. We follow the literature on financial fragility and
refer to this rationale as the prudential motive for capital controls. While not explicitly
modeled here, other non-prudential motives commonly discussed in the literature (e.g.
targeting the real exchange rate or dealing with the ”trilemma”) can also fit into this
category. As prudential controls, they aim at manipulating the domestic rather than
international interest rate.
A second source of market failure arises whenever country i is large enough to affect
the world interest rate (mi > 0). It is well known in the literature that large countries
attempt to exploit their market power by taking advantage of the effect that their
policy has on the world interest rate (terms-of-trade effect). For instance, a borrowing
country exploits its monopsonistic power in the capital market by taxing capital inflows
so as to limit domestic demand and thus keep a ”low” cost of capital. In solving the
optimization problem defined above, the national planner of country i knows that R
depends on its own domestic capital demand mi(ci1− yi1) through the following market-
clearing condition for the world economy, stating that the sum of net supplies of capital
for the world as a whole must be null:
n∑
i=1
mi[yi1 − ci1(R, τ i)] = 0. (7)
In the rest of the paper, we refer to this second rationale for imposing capital controls
as the terms-of-trade motive.8
We are now ready to formally characterize the optimal capital control for country
i.
Proposition 1 (Unilaterally Optimal Capital Controls) The unilateral optimal policy
8As the above discussion highlights, in this standard macro framework, we could define national
welfare as W i
(
Ri, R
)
; that is, directly in terms of the local and world interest rates that capital control
selections imply. This general formulation is equivalent to the one used in the trade policy coordination
literature (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999 and 2002), where the governments’ objectives are a function of
the local and world prices implied by tariff selection.
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(τ i∗) can be decomposed into a prudential motive (τ̂ i) and a terms-of-trade motive (τ˜ i),
such that
1 + τ i∗ = (1 + τ̂ i)(1 + τ˜ i), (8)
with
τ̂ i =
{
x′(ci1−yi1)
u′(ci1)−x′(ci1−yi1)
when ci1 − yi1 > 0
0 when ci1 − yi1 ≤ 0
. (9)
and
τ˜ i = mi · ε−i, (10)
where ε−i is the inverse elasticity of global savings faced by country i, and it is given by
ε−i = [dR/d(Y −i1 −C−i1 )]·(Y −i1 −C−i1 )/R with Y −i1 ≡
∑
j 6=im
jY j1 and C
−i
1 ≡
∑
j 6=im
jCj1.
Capital controls can be imposed for prudential or terms-of-trade reasons. Expression
(9) captures country i’s optimal prudential controls. They are null whenever i is a
lender. In fact, since the externality is null, the solution to the welfare maximization
for a rational forward-looking national planner coincides with the utility maximization
of the representative consumer, and the optimal prudential policy is no-intervention:
τ̂ i = 0. Capital controls are instead strictly positive when country i is a borrower. In
particular, the expression x′(ci1 − yi1)/[u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)] tells us that (i) low levels of
current consumption -and thus a high marginal utility of it- imply weak optimal capital
controls; (ii) a strong marginal effect of the negative externality implies strong capital
controls.
Expression (10) is the well known formula for the unilaterally optimal tax of a
country that exploits its market power. A borrowing country faces a positive elasticity
(ε−i > 0), and hence taxes capital inflows (τ˜ i > 0). In particular, a more rigid supply
of capital from the rest the world (that is, a higher ε−i) commands stronger controls
on capital inflows (that is, a higher τ˜ i). On the other hand, a lending country faces a
negative elasticity (ε−i < 0), and hence taxes capital outflows (τ˜ i < 0). Moreover, a
more rigid demand of capital from the rest of the world (that is, a lower ε−i) implies
stronger controls on capital outflows (that is, a lower τ˜ i ).
We conclude this section with the definition of equilibrium for this economy. The
equilibrium is a configuration in which agents maximize their utility, each national
planner implements the unilaterally optimal capital control policy, and the international
market for capital clears. Specifically,
Definition. (World Market Equilibrium) A world market equilibrium is defined as
the gross real world interest rate R∗ and each country’s consumption plan and capital
controls {ci∗1 , ci∗2 , τ i∗}ni=1 that satisfy (3), (5), (7), and (8).
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2.3 Capital Flow Deflection
In this section and the next we focus on countries that are borrowers, and we analyze
the cross-border spillovers associated with capital controls as well as the policy reactions
to these spillovers. In particular, we carry out a comparative statics exercise in this
section to analyze the effects of a change in capital controls in a set of countries on the
world interest rate, as well as on the amount and the distribution of capital flows to the
borrowing countries. Denote by Ω the set of borrowing countries , and by S any subset
of it, S ⊆ Ω, with country i belonging to S.9 We start with the following statement.
Lemma 1. A rise in the capital controls in the set of borrowing countries S−i (with
S−i ≡ S\i), ( τS−i ↑)
(i) lowers the equilibrium world interest rate ( dR∗/dτS
−i
< 0) and
(ii) lowers the total amount of world savings ( d[
∑
ωm
ω[Y ω1 −Cω1 (R, τω)]]/dτS−i < 0
∀ω : Y ω1 − Cω1 > 0).
The findings of Lemma 1 are instrumental to prove our next propositions on the
multilateral effects of capital controls. The first of these effects is capital flow deflection,
which is the spillover effect of more stringent controls in one (or more) borrowing
countries on the amount of capital inflows accruing to other borrowing countries. This
effect is studied in the following
Proposition 2 (Capital Flow Deflection) A rise in the capital controls in the set of
borrowing countries S−i ( τS
−i ↑) causes an increase in capital inflows to country i, that
is:
d[ci1(R, τ
i)− yi1]
dτS−i
> 0 ∀i ∈ S.
Proposition 2 simply states that, when a borrowing country raises its barriers to
capital inflows, it deflects part of these flows to other borrowing countries. The existence
of this cross-country spillover effect of capital controls will be verified empirically in the
second part of this paper.
The intuition behind capital flow deflection is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.
The graph is divided in three parts. Part (i) plots the world demand (CFD) and
9We allow S ⊂ Ω as in practice financial markets may be (partially) segmented, for instance because
different subgroups of borrowing countries may be considered imperfect substitutes by international
investors. While we here prefer to remain general and avoid unnecessarily complicated formalization,
in the empirical analysis S ⊂ Ω will in fact denote a subgroup of possibly ”similar” borrowing countries
from the perspective of investors (say, in terms of geographic location or country risk). See subsection
3.2.3 for details.
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supply (CFS) of capital. Parts (ii) and (iii) instead represent the demand of capital for
respectively the borrowing country i (CFDi) and the rest of the borrowing countries
S−i (CFDS−i), where for simplicity we assume S = Ω. The initial world market
equilibrium is such that R∗ equalizes the supply of capital (measured by the distance
AB) to the demand of capital (measured by the distance CD + EF ). A rise in the
capital controls of the borrowing countries S−i ( τS
−i ↑) shifts the demand of capital to
the left (from CFD to CFD′), thus generating lower world savings and a lower world
interest rate R∗′ (Lemma 1). In particular, R∗′ is now such that the new lower capital
supply (AB′) equalizes the new lower capital demand (CD′+EF ′). The spillover effect
arises because, as a consequence of a lower interest rate, capital inflows accruing to the
borrowing country i increase (by the measure DD′). In other words, while less capital
flows to borrowing countries as a whole (capital flow “depression”), part of the capital
flows previously directed towards countries S−i are now deflected to the borrowing
country i.
Figure 3: Capital Flow Deflection
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2.4 Capital Contr s’ Response
We now introduce the policy response of borrowing countries to capital controls
imposed by other borrowers. We show that the nature of this policy response depends
on the motive (prudential or terms-of-trade) for capital controls. Our findings are
summarized in the following
Proposition 3 (The Policy Response) A rise in the capital controls in the set of borrow-
ing countries S−i ( τS
−i ↑) causes a policy response by country i which can be decomposed
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into
dτ i∗
dτS−i
=
dτ̂ i
dτS−i
(1 + τ˜ i) +
dτ˜ i
dτS−i
(1 + τ̂ i).
where
(i)
dτ̂ i
dτS−i
=
dτ̂ i
dR
dR∗
dτS−i
> 0 and (ii)
dτ˜ i
dτS−i
= − m
i dε−i
dτS−i
mi dε
−i
dτ˜ i
− 1 ≶ 0.
We have isolated two, possibly opposing, forces that govern the relationship of
capital control policies among borrowing countries. The presence of a capital inflows’
negative externality makes the policies complementary, while the exploitation of market
power by large borrowing countries may or may not act in the same direction depending
on the impact of capital controls on the elasticity of global savings.
This result can be rationalized as follows. A rise in capital controls in a set
of countries (or just in a single large country) lowers the equilibrium interest rate
(dR∗/dτS
−i
< 0) and raises capital inflows to country i (Proposition 2). This exacer-
bates the negative domestic externality and thus leads country i to “defend itself” from
an excessive capital inflow by raising its own capital controls for prudential reasons
(dτ̂ i/dR < 0). If country i is small, its reaction to an increase of capital controls in
other borrowing countries is unambiguous: it responds by raising its own barriers (part
(i)).
If country i is large, instead, the nature of the relationship among capital controls -
that is, whether capital controls are complements or substitutes - also depends on the
sign of dτ˜ i/dτS
−i
, which in turn depends on how the (inverse of the) elasticity of global
savings faced by borrowing country i (ε−i) responds to changes in the capital controls
of the countries involved (part (ii)). In fact, in deciding its optimal policy response,
a large country i takes into account, not only the effect of countries S−i’s policies but
also the one of its own policy on elasticity ε−i. In the proof of Proposition 3, we show
that both effects are ambiguous and ultimately rest on the preference fundamentals of
consumers. In particular, we show that the complementarity or substitutability of the
terms-of-trade driven capital controls depend on whether these controls become more
or less effective in affecting the world interest rate as they increase.10
The proposition shows how prudential controls (and, more broadly, any inflow re-
strictions aiming at manipulating the domestic interest rate) respond to exogenous
10This is not surprising: by definition, optimal terms-of-trade driven controls for country i are
stronger, the greater the sensitivity of the world interest rate to the supply of capital faced by country
i (dR/d(y−i1 −c−i1 )). As a result, if an increase in τS
−i
implies an ever greater impact of capital inflows
on the world interest rate (d2R/d(y−i1 − c−i1 )2 · d(y−i1 − c−i1 )/dτS
−i
> 0), then, other things equal,
country i is more likely to respond to such increase by raising its own policy, thus implying that the
terms-of-trade driven capital controls are more likely to be complementary (dτ˜ i/dτS
−i
> 0).
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shocks. Taken together, Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 delineate a complementary rela-
tionship between the world interest rate and prudential capital control policies, whereby
a lower interest rate leads to more restrictions on capital inflows, and vice versa. Such
complementarity may amplify the effects of exogenous shocks to the world economy or
to any subset S of it, thus giving rise to what is usually called a multiplier effect. More
formally, denote by τ̂ i(R∗, ρ) the optimal prudential policy function for country i ∈ S,
and where parameter ρ captures any feature that affects τ̂ i other than changes in R∗
(such as the endowments yit, or the discount factor β
i). We are now ready to formulate
the following:
Corollary 1. (The Multiplier Effect) A shock to any subset of borrowing countries
S causes a prudential policy response of each borrowing country i ∈ S which can be
decomposed into ∣∣∣∣∣dτ̂ idρ
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∂τ̂ i∂ρ + dτ̂ idR dR∗dτS−i · dτ̂S−idρ
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣∂τ̂ i∂ρ
∣∣∣∣∣ .
A multiplier effect characterizes the prudential capital control policy of each country i,
as the total equilibrium response is higher than the partial equilibrium response because
(dτ̂ i/dR)(dR∗/dτS
−i
) > 0.
The complementary relationship between τ̂ i and R∗ that gives rise to the multiplier
effect is illustrated graphically in Figure 4. To gain an intuition of this corollary, suppose
a non-negligible fraction of borrowing countries are hit by an exogenous shock (ρ ↑)
that induces them to raise their restrictions on capital inflows, say from point E to E ′
in Figure 4. This rise in capital controls lowers the world interest rate (as proven in
point 1 of Lemma 1), which moves from E ′ to E ′′. Each country, however, reacts to a
lower R by further increasing its optimal capital controls from E ′′ to E ′′′, which in turn
triggers a further decrease in the world interest rate, and so on and so forth. As a result
of this chain reaction, the aggregate policy response to the shock, as measured by the
horizontal distance between point E and point F , exceeds the initial capital controls
imposed by each individual borrowing country, as measured by the length EE ′.
2.5 Welfare
Let us close this section with a remark on the welfare implications of the theoretical
model. It is well known that, from a global welfare perspective, prudential and terms-
of-trade-driven controls have radically different consequences. Under the conditions
stated in Korinek (2014) that the set of policy instruments and markets are complete,
prudential controls are efficient both from a unilateral and from a multilateral point of
view. Policy intervention aimed at exploiting the terms of trade effect is instead sub-
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Figure 4: The Multiplier Effect in Capital Controls
optimal.11 As a result, while unilateral capital controls driven by terms of trade motives
call for a role of multilateral institutions to improve international policy coordination,
no need for such institutions arises when policy measures are set for prudential reasons
only. However, if the government has imperfect policy instruments (e.g. costly capital
controls) or if markets are incomplete, the complementarity highlighted in the multiplier
effect may lead to an inefficient world equilibrium characterized by excessively high
restrictions and thus call for international policy coordination.
3 Do Capital Controls Deflect Capital Flows and
Lead to a Policy Response?
The previous section shows the existence of a spillover effect of capital controls on
other borrowing countries and of a policy response (Propositions 2 and 3). In this
section, we investigate their empirical relevance. In particular, we use a dynamic panel
and push-pull factors model to study the impact of inflow controls on gross inflows to
other countries and the impact of inflow controls on capital controls imposed by other
countries.
The recent empirical literature on capital flows differentiates between gross and net
11Indeed, it can be proven that aggregate welfare is maximized under the unilaterally optimal policy
defined in expression (9). In this respect, the multiplier effect identified in Corollary 1 describes the
chain of optimal prudential policy responses to a common shock hitting a borrowing region.
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flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Gross inflows are the net of foreign purchases of
domestic assets and foreign sales of domestic assets. In other words, gross inflows mea-
sure the change in the stock of gross foreign liability before any valuation adjustment.
Gross outflows measure the change in the stock of foreign assets before any valuation
adjustment. Net flows are the difference between the two.
Capital controls can target either gross inflows or gross outflows. Inflow controls
target gross inflows: these are restrictions imposed on foreign purchases of domestic
assets and/or foreign sales of domestic assets. Inflow controls could be imposed either
on the foreigner who trades the domestic assets with a domestic counterpart or on the
domestic resident who trades the domestic assets with a foreign counterpart. On the
other hand, outflow controls target gross outflows: these are restrictions imposed on
domestic residents’ purchases of foreign assets or domestic residents’ sales of foreign as-
sets. Such restrictions could be imposed either on the domestic resident who trades the
foreign assets with a foreign counterpart or foreigner who trades the foreign assets with
a domestic counterpart. Both inflow and outflow controls have in common that they
discriminate on the basis of residency. In this respect, they differ from the broader set
of capital flow management measures and from other (non-discriminatory) prudential
measures (IMF, 2013).
In order to precisely test the theory in Section 2, we focus on a measure of inflow
controls (rather than generic capital controls, which also include restrictions on capital
outflows) and on gross inflows instead of net flows, because the latter include the gross
outflow component. Our empirical investigation has two parts. First, we examine the
impact of inflow controls imposed by other countries on one’s gross inflows (capital
flow deflection).12 Second, we examine the impact of inflow controls imposed by other
countries on one’s inflow controls (policy response).
3.1 Data
Our sample consists of 78 less industrialized countries and emerging markets (see
Table 1 for the full list). We focus on developing countries as they are more likely to
employ capital controls than more advanced countries which are blessed with a wider
set of policy instruments to address domestic distortions.13 The sample period spans
15 years from 1995-2009 and the data are in annual frequency. A country is included
in our sample only if it has at least ten years of observations for all variables used
12Obviously, capital controls can have more than one spillover effect. Gross outflows are directly
affected by inflow controls in recipient countries as one’s outflow is another’s inflow. Following the
terminology in the trade literature, we can refer to this spillover effect as capital flow depression, which
differs from the capital flow deflection analyzed here.
13There are 443 instances of changes in inflow controls from 1995-2009 among developing countries,
while the number is 69 among more advanced economies during the same period. The average inflow
restriction index for the period is 0.5 among developing countries, while it is only 0.2 among more
advanced countries.
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in the regression models. While the sample period, data frequency and the selection
of countries are inevitably constrained by data availability, the panel covers several
interesting episodes including the crises in Asia in the 1990s and in South America in
the early 2000s and the first two years of the Great Recession, 2007-2009.
Table 1. Country List by RiskTable'2.'Time'Invariant'Risk'Groups'
*'Composite'risk'index'is'used'to'measure'risk.'All'countries'listed'are'used'for'compu<ng'''''''''.'Countries'in'bold'are'used'for'regressions.''
High Risk High-Moderate Risk Low-Moderate Risk Low Risk  
Angola Albania Argentina Bahamas, The 
Burkina Faso Algeria Azerbaijan Bahrain 
Congo, Republic of Armenia Bolivia Botswana 
Côte d'Ivoire Bangladesh Brazil Chile 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Belarus Bulgaria China 
Ethiopia Cameroon Dominican Republic Costa Rica 
Guinea Colombia Egypt Croatia 
Guinea-Bissau Ecuador El Salvador Hungary 
Haiti Ghana Gabon Jordan 
Iraq Guyana Guatemala Kuwait 
Lebanon Honduras India Latvia 
Liberia Indonesia Iran Libya 
Malawi Kenya Jamaica Lithuania 
Mozambique Madagascar Kazakhstan Malaysia 
Myanmar Mali Papua New Guinea Mexico 
Nicaragua Moldova Paraguay Morocco 
Niger Mongolia Peru Namibia 
Nigeria Romania Philippines Oman 
Pakistan Senegal Russia Panama 
Sierra Leone Sri Lanka South Africa Poland 
Sudan Suriname Syria Qatar 
Togo Tanzania Thailand Saudi Arabia 
Turkey Uganda Ukraine Trinidad and Tobago 
Zambia Venezuela Uruguay Tunisia 
Zimbabwe Yemen Vietnam United Arab Emirates 
Note: Time-invariant groups by composite risk. The countries in bold are used in the
regression analysis. All the countries listed are used in computing τS
−i
.
We use Schindler’s (2009) index of capital controls, which is a de jure measure con-
structed from information contained in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) provided by the IMF. The main advantage of
this index relative to others commonly used in the literature such as Chinn and Ito
(2006) is that the Schindler index distinguishes between controls on capital inflows
and outflows. In particular, Schindler’s index calculates inflow controls as the average
of the restriction dummies on the following series of international transactions: pur-
chase of financial assets locally by nonresidents, sale or issue of financial assets abroad
by residents, collective investment by nonresidents to residents, financial credits by
nonresidents to residents, inward direct investment, and liquidation of direction invest-
ment.14 The index varies between 0 (i.e. no restriction) and 1 (i.e. restrictions on all
14Financial assets are shares or other securities of a participating nature, bonds or other debt se-
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international transactions). Schindler also computes outflow controls in a similar way.15
We will use this second set of restrictions in our robustness analysis.
The data on capital controls are depicted in Figure 5. Panel 5.A plots the inflow con-
trols by regions, with higher numbers indicating more stringent restrictions.16 There are
noticeable differences as well as some common trends across regions. Asian and former
Soviet bloc countries are more likely to have higher inflow restrictions than Latin Amer-
ican and central and east European countries. Countries across all regions tightened
inflow controls during the Asian financial crisis, and the high level persisted in most
regions except for central and east European countries that were going through capital
account liberations in preparation for EU membership. During the 2007 financial cri-
sis, most regions tightened inflow controls except for countries of the former Soviet bloc
whose restrictions were nevertheless very stringent compared to other regions except
for Asia.
Figure 5 also depicts inflow restrictions when we group countries by economic charac-
teristics rather than geographic location. Specifically, we focus on export specialization
(Panel 5.B), growth rate (Panel 5.C) and composite risk (Panel 5.D). By dividing coun-
tries into groups, we aim at capturing characteristics that render them close substitutes
from the perspective of international investors. In this regard, the natural way to group
countries together is based on the similarity of risk and return, as they are the two main
determinants of investment decisions. Forbes et al. (2013) find that countries export-
ing to China are affected by Brazil’s capital inflow restrictions. Since these countries
are mostly commodity exporters, we also consider export specialization as a relevant
country grouping.17 Just like geographic location, groups by economic characteristics
also display some interesting common patterns. In particular, countries with lower
composite risk tend to display more stable and lower capital controls relative to riskier
countries. Primary goods and service exporters tend to have lower inflow restrictions
than fuel, manufacturing and diversified exporters. Finally, no clear pattern emerges
when we group countries by growth rate.
Following Forbes and Warnock (2012) we compute gross capital inflows as the sum
of net portfolio investment liabilities, other liabilities, and net foreign direct investment.
All components of gross capital inflows are available from the IMF’s International Finan-
curities, other market instruments. A more detailed description of the index and its methodology are
available in the appendix.
15Restrictions on capital outflows are the average of the restriction dummies on purchase of financial
assets abroad by residents, sale or issue of financial assets locally by nonresidents, collective invest-
ments by residents to nonresidents, financial credits by residents to nonresidents, and outward direct
investment.
16We follow the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) and divide countries into six regional groups:
Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Sahara Africa, Former Soviet Bloc, and Central
and East Europe.
17For export specialization we continue to follow the WEO classification and divide countries into
five groups: fuel exporters, primary goods exporters, manufacturing exporters, service exporters, and
diversified exporters.
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Figure 5: Schindler’s Inflow Control Index by Groups
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cial Statistics (IFS) database as reported in BPM5 format.18 Table 2 shows summary
statistics of inflow controls, gross inflows, and other variables used in the regression
analysis. Table 3 reports the data sources. Note that we have two measures that
capture the risk of investing in a country: composite risk and law and order. Higher
values indicate lower risk. The composite risk index is a measure of a country’s com-
bined economic, financial, institutional, and political risks, while law and order index
captures mainly the institutional risk of a country. For this reason, we focus on the
composite risk index as the proxy for country risk in our main regressions. The other
measure of country risk is used in the robustness analysis. The other variables in the
spillover analysis are standard taken from the push-pull factor literature. We use real
US interest rate as a proxy for world real interest. This is computed from annualized
US three month treasury rate adjusted by US inflation. The VIX index is used as a
proxy for global volatility. Inflation and other country specific variables come from the
WEO, while we use Ilzetzki et al. (2010) for exchange rate regime classifications.
18Some components of gross inflows have value 0 in some countries, but our data source does not
specify whether these are really zero or missing information. In our regressions, we try both interpre-
tations and they lead to the same findings. Below, we report the results where gross capital flows are
computed by treating a 0 observation as no capital inflows.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics by Country Groups
Data$summary$
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Schindler index (inflows restrictions) 1170 0.49 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Gross  inflows (% GDP) 1108 4.84 8.08 -38.99 63.85 
VIX 1170 21.54 6.45 12.58 34.04 
Real US interest rate 1170 0.94 1.63 -2.36 3.18 
Inflation 1135 15.01 54.01 -9.86 1061.21 
Real GDP growth rate 1169 4.12 4.72 -24.79 62.19 
Nominal GDP per capita in USD (logged) 1159 7.42 1.17 4.38 10.66 
Nominal GDP in USD (logged) 1170 10.10 1.70 6.47 15.42 
Real effective exchange rate 1170 106.78 33.93 56.09 597.37 
Composite risk 1138 66.24 8.72 28.00 86.70 
Law and order 1138 3.38 1.14 1.00 6.00 
de facto exchange rate regime 1134 2.17 1.15 1.00 6.00 
Table 3. Data Sources
Data$source$
Data Source 
Capital flows International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
Capital controls  Schindler (2009)  
VIX Yahoo Finance 
US three month treasury rate Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
Inflation rate World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Real GDP growth rate WEO 
Nominal GDP per capita in US$ WEO 
Nominal GDP in US$ WEO 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Information Notice System (INS) 
Composite risk index Political Risk Service (PRS) 
Law and Order PRS 
de facto Exchange rate regime classification Reinhart et al. (2008) 
Election Year Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
Political Orientation of the Ruling Party DPI 
3.2 Evidence of Capital Flow Deflection
In this subsection, we present evidence that capital controls deflect capital flows to
other countries. We first present our empirical strategy, which extends the standard
push-pull factor model to account for spillover effects. Then we present the regression
results for the entire sample of developing economies and for groups of countries that are
likely substitutes from the perspective of international investors. Finally, we undertake
a series of robustness tests.
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3.2.1 Empirical Strategy
We follow closely the empirical literature on the determinants of capital flows (e.g.
Ghosh et al. 2012, Forbes and Warnock, 2012) and use a standard pull-push model
with an additional variable that captures the spillover effect of inflow restrictions.19
Specifically, the regression equation is
ωit = β0 + β1Rt + β2τ
i
t−1 + β3τ
S−i
t + β4x
i
t + u
i
t, (11)
where ωit denotes country i’s gross capital inflow as a percentage of GDP at time t
(henceforth, subscript t denotes the time and i denotes the country), Rt is the real
world interest rate, τ it−1 denotes country i’s capital inflow controls (lagged once), τ
S−i
t
denotes the (weighted average of the) inflow restrictions of all countries in the set S−i
(where, recall, S−i = {S/i} and i ∈ S), which is computed from
τS
−i
t =
∑
j∈S−i y
j
t τ
j
t∑
j∈S−i y
j
t
, (12)
yit being real GDP, x
i
t is a vector of the rest of pull-push factors that determine ω
i
t
commonly used in the literature, and uit is the error term.
The model in Section 2 predicts that β1 and β2 are negative as households reduce
current consumption by borrowing less when the world real interest rate goes up or when
inflow restrictions tighten, so that the domestic interest rate raises vis-a-vis the world
interest rate. Differently from previous studies, we also include τS
−i
t as an explanatory
variable since capital controls in the set of countries S−i can deflect capital flows to
country i. β3 captures this spillover effect, and our model predicts it to be positive.
The rest of the standard pull-push factors include global volatility, lagged real GDP
growth rate, lagged real GDP growth rate shock20, lagged real GDP per capita, and
country risk.21 We lag all the domestic pull factors as well as domestic inflow controls
to reduce endogeneity problems. Global push factors and the rest of the world’s capital
inflow controls are contemporaneous as they are less likely to suffer from endogeneity
with the dependent variable. The expected signs of explanatory variables are reported
in the last column of the regression tables for convenience.
19See Magud et al. (2012) for a survey of the literature.
20The real GDP growth rate shock is the log difference between the real GDP growth rate and its
H-P filtered trend.
21In the regressions, we also introduce additional controls used in the literature of push and pull
factors. They include: domestic inflation, real effective exchange rate overvaluation, de facto exchange
rate regime. The findings discussed below are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables.
However, we do not include them in our baseline regressions because their coefficients are never signif-
icant.
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3.2.2 Benchmark Regression
Table 4 shows the OLS estimation results of equation (11) for the entire sample (i.e.
when S = Ω). For expositional clarity, variables are divided into three blocks: global
push variables that only vary across time and are invariant across countries; domestic
pull factors that vary across both time and countries; and the spillover variable –the
rest of world’s capital inflow control– which also varies both across time and countries.
Column (1) reports the OLS coefficients for equation (11). To reduce possible omitted
variable bias, column 2 reports the OLS coefficients when year fixed effects are included.
Since global push factors only vary over time but do not vary across countries, they
drop out in the specification with year fixed effects.
Table 4. Capital Flow Deflection (Entire Sample)
  (1) (2) Expected Signs 
Global Push Factors 
Real US interest rate -0.337** - 
(0.152) 
VIX -0.132*** - 
(0.0490) 
Domestic Pull Factors (all lagged) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.595*** 0.504** + 
(0.188) (0.194) 
Real GDP growth rate shock  -0.434** -0.406* - 
(0.209) (0.207) 
Real GDP per capita (logged) 0.652 0.481 + 
(0.571) (0.565) 
De jure Capital inflow control -2.468* -2.455* - 
(1.341) (1.440) 
Composite risk index  0.150** 0.143** + 
(0.0647) (0.0646) 
Spillovers 
ROG's inflow control 23.00*** 8.013 + 
(5.807) (27.50) 
Year fixed effects No  Yes 
Observations 1,007 1,007 
R-squared 0.135 0.167   
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p
< 0.05, * p < 0.1
Both specifications are able to explain more than 10% of the variation in gross capital
inflows. All variables except for real GDP per capita are significant determinants of
gross capital inflows and their coefficients have the expected signs.22 Our key variable of
22A priori, it is not obvious what sign the coefficient on real GDP per capita should have. On the
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interest, the rest of group’s capital inflow controls (τS
−i
t ), is significant in the standard
push-pull factor model. But the variable becomes insignificant once we control for the
year fixed effects, implying that the spillover effect found in column (1) is likely to be
due to omitted variable bias. In particular, global push factors other than the ones
included in regression (11) may cause gross capital inflows in a developing country and
capital controls in the rest of the world to move in the same direction. The lesson from
Table 2 is, therefore, that the pull-push model (11) explains gross capital inflows to
developing countries reasonably well, but the evidence of spillover effects from the rest
of the world is not robust.
The lack of evidence of capital flow deflection for the entire sample is hardly surpris-
ing and is in line with other studies (Forbes et al., 2013). In particular, note that this
exercise is not a good test of the model in Section 2. An underlying assumption of the
model is that countries are identical, if not for the capital controls they implement. In
other words, there is a single perfectly integrated world capital market, where all these
countries are perfect substitutes from the perspective of investors. This assumption
clearly does not hold when we consider the entire sample, where countries are highly
heterogeneous, but it could be more reasonable when we look at a smaller group of
countries with similar characteristics. Specifically, capital flow deflection may be sig-
nificant within well defined groups of developing economies, while still be on average
irrelevant for the broad (and highly heterogeneous) sample. This is precisely what we
investigate next.
3.2.3 Capital Flow Deflection within Country Groups
In this subsection, we divide countries into groups of likely substitutes based on some
common characteristics and investigate the existence of capital flow deflection within
these groups. In particular, we group countries based on geographic location, export
specialization, return, and risk. In other words, we consider the subset of countries S
to which country i belongs either as a geographic region (say, Latin America or Sub-
Saharan Africa) or as a group defined by certain economic characteristics (say, fuel
exporters, fast growing economies, or high risk countries).
As discussed above, we use the composite risk index as a proxy for country specific
risk and real GDP growth rate as a proxy for country specific return. We divide
countries into four groups depending on the countries’ average real GDP growth rates
and average composite risk across the sample period. For example, a country i belongs
one hand, higher real GDP per capita is associated with higher level of financial development, which
should lead to more inflows. On the other hand, lower real GDP per capital is also associated with
weak economic infrastructure and financial capacity, which implies more need for foreign investment
and capital inflows. Previous studies find mixed results. Ghosh et al. (2012) find real GDP per capita
to reduce the probability of experiencing a net flow surge, while Forbes and Warnock (2012) find no
evidence that real GDP per capita is associated with gross inflow surge.
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to the low return group if its sample average growth rate is in the bottom 25 percentile
of all countries. We call these groups as time-invariant groups since the composition of
the groups remains the same over time. To allow the composition of groups to change
over time, we also consider time-variant groups. For example, a country i belongs to
the low return group at time t if it is in the bottom 25 percentile among all countries
at t. So a country could move from the low return group to a medium-low return
group as it grows faster over time. Export specialization and geographic regions follow
the definitions used in the IMF’s WEO. As mentioned earlier, there are six geographic
regions and five export specializations. Table 1 shows the time-invariant groups based
on risk.23
Table 5 reports the coefficients for τS
−i
t , which is our main variable of interest.
The coefficients for other variables are almost identical to the ones in Table 4.24 Each
coefficient in Table 5 comes from a different specification of (11), and there are 36
regression specifications in total. These specifications differ by country-groups (which
gives the six rows in the table) and by the set of controls (which gives the six columns
in the table). Specifically, in columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) we control for a different
combination of group contagion variable and country fixed effects, with the number of
controls increasing as the column number ascends. Country fixed effects are introduced
to reduce omitted variable bias. The group contagion variable is computed as the
GDP weighted fraction of countries in S−i that experience gross inflow surge and is
included to control for the common shocks to the group.25 Finally, we lag the rest of
the group’s inflow controls by one period in (4)-(6) to alleviate possible endogeneity
problems between ωit and τ
S−i
t .
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We find strong evidence of within-group capital flow deflection when countries are
grouped based on risk as all coefficients have the correct sign and are highly significant.
Not surprisingly, grouping countries by time-variant risk groups gives more robust re-
sults relative to the time-invariant risk groups (significance is at the 1% level), as foreign
investors are likely to be sensitive to changes over time to the riskiness of a country.
23There are 124 countries in the list, 78 of which are in bold. All the countries listed have both GDP
and capital inflow restriction data available throughout the sample period, which allows us to compute
the rest of the group’s capital inflow restrictions. The countries in bold are the ones with at least ten
years of observations for the rest of the explanatory variables, and hence are used for regressions.
24The only major difference is the coefficient for a country’s own capital controls, which is positive
but insignificant in the specification with country fixed effects. This finding is consistent with the
empirical literature (see Magud et al., 2011) and results from the well-known endogeneity problem
between a country’s own capital controls and inflows (i.e. higher flows induce a country to adjust
prudential restrictions). Given the persistence of capital controls, it is not surprising that simply
lagging inflow restrictions does not entirely solve this problem. Forbes et al. (2013) use a propensity
score matching method to deal with this econometric challenge. They find that, while broad measures
of inflow controls may not be systematically effective, specific measures (e.g. those targeting equity or
bond flows) and ”major” policy changes lead to a significant reduction in capital inflows.
25The group contagion variable is computed as
∑
j∈S−i y
j
tSurge
j
t∑
j∈S−i y
j
t
where Surgejt is defined in 3.2.4.
26In subsection 3.2.5, we use an IV approach to further address endogeneity concerns.
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Table 5. Within-Group Capital Flow Deflection
Gross%inﬂow%and%inﬂow%control%
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Group by geographic location -1.573 -1.573 2.128 -0.699 -0.699 3.898 
(2.388) (2.388) (4.539) (2.403) (2.403) (4.698) 
Group by export specialization 0.277 0.380 7.535* 0.618 0.750 8.508** 
(2.829) (2.762) (4.452) (2.938) (2.855) (4.043) 
Groups by returns 
Time-invariant groups by growth rate 4.124 3.875 6.948 3.704 3.416 3.752 
(3.999) (3.880) (6.062) (3.700) (3.605) (3.578) 
Time-variant groups by growth rate 1.574 0.825 -1.247 -0.238 -0.338 -2.722* 
(2.214) (2.259) (1.647) (2.199) (2.188) (1.407) 
Groups by risks 
Time-invariant groups by composite 
risk 10.32* 10.26* 16.85*** 7.434 7.619 12.29* 
(5.831) (5.780) (6.032) (5.492) (5.665) (6.268) 
Time-variant groups by composite risk 8.752*** 7.223*** 3.839** 11.52*** 10.47*** 6.624*** 
(2.816) (2.610) (1.742) (3.367) (3.095) (2.421) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group Contagion No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Lagged ROG's inflow control No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table reports the spillover coefficient β3 in regression equation (11) for 36 different
specifications. Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p< 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
We find no within-group spillover effect when counties are grouped by geographic lo-
cation, export specialization or returns. The results are robust when we deduct FDIs
from the definition of gross inflows, which suggests that short-term (portfolio and other
investment) flows are the main drivers of the spillover effect.27
To interpret the coefficients and therefore to understand the magnitude of capital
flow deflection, we compute the range of spillover effects for the increase in capital
inflow restrictions in Brazil in 2009 on the gross inflows of capital to South Africa. Both
countries belong to the same time-variant and time-invariant risk group. In 2009, Brazil
increased its capital inflow restriction by 0.42, and in the same year South Africa’s gross
capital inflows were 5.69% of its GDP. The coefficient estimates of β3 when countries
are grouped by (time-variant) risk ranges between 3.84 and 8.75 (without lagging τS
−i
t ).
Using the lowest and highest estimate, our calculation shows that South Africa’s gross
capital inflows would have been between 5.21% and 4.72% of its GDP if Brazil had not
increased its inflow restrictions in 2009. In other words we find that Brazil’s introduction
of inflow controls in 2009 increased gross inflows to South Africa by between 0.48% and
0.97% of its GDP. To get an idea of how large this spillover effect is, compare it to
27Coefficients for the spillover variable are very similar to the ones shown in Table 5 and, hence, are
not reported in this paper.
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the effect caused by a 1 percentage point reduction in real US interest rate. Our
estimation from Table 4 predicts that a 1 percentage point reduction in the real US
interest rate increases gross inflows by 0.34%. Hence spillover effects coming from
another country’s change in capital controls could be several magnitude higher than
the effect of a change in US monetary policy, at least when the restricting country is a
major emerging economy like Brazil and the policy change is significant.
Our findings indicate that capital flow deflection affects countries with similar eco-
nomic characteristics, more than neighbors. The lack of evidence of spillover effects
at the regional level, however, has more than one explanation. One possibility is that
investors, on average, do not see countries in the same region as sufficiently similar to
justify reallocation of investment within the group when one country increases capital
controls. However, a second explanation is that the capital deflection model presented
in the previous section is not the only mechanism at work. For instance, investors may
take an increase in inflow restrictions in one country as a signal that others will in-
troduce similar measures and, therefore, reduce rather than increase investment to the
latter. If this ”policy emulation” or ”contagion” effect is perceived to be stronger among
neighboring countries (perhaps because the electorate is more likely to be informed on,
and politicians to be influenced by, policy developments in a nearby country), then it
is possible that the capital flow deflection is offset by a separate spillover effect in the
opposite direction in regional groupings. In this case, the average effect is imprecisely
captured in regression analysis and results in an insignificant coefficient.
3.2.4 Robustness Tests
This subsection looks at several robustness tests of the result on capital flow de-
flection. Specifically, we look at surges in capital inflows (rather than at the level of
gross inflows); we use measures of inflow restrictions other than the Schindler index.
We finally perform a number of additional robustness tests.
First, we focus on surges in capital inflows. Recent studies such as Ghosh et al.
(2012) and Forbes et al. (2013) focus on episodes of extreme capital inflow that they
refer as surges. Instead of studying the spillover effects on the magnitude of gross
inflows, we investigate whether restrictions in other countries affect the probability of
experiencing a surge. We use a probit model in an otherwise identical push-pull model:
Prob(Surgeit = 1) = Φ(β0 + β1Rt + β2τ
i
t−1 + β3τ
S−i
t + β4x
i
t + e
i
t), (13)
where Surgeit equals to one if country i experiences a surge at time t, and zero otherwise.
Similar to Ghosh et al. (2012), we define a country to have a gross inflow surge in a
year if its gross inflow to GDP is greater than 80% of its historical values across time
and 80% of all countries’ values in that given year.28 The probit regression results of
28Ghosh et al. (2012) use the threshold of 70% and look at net flows.
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(13) are reported in Table 6. The results are largely consistent with the findings in
Table 5.
Table 6. Within-Group Capital Flow Deflection: Surges
Surges:(gross(inﬂow(and(inﬂow(control(
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Group by geographic location -0.113 0.0755 -0.0656 0.161 0.345 -0.0645 
(0.665) (0.625) (0.243) (0.653) (0.595) (0.194) 
Group by export specialization -0.399 -0.504 0.148 -0.388 -0.488 0.119 
(0.558) (0.562) (0.204) (0.575) (0.581) (0.162) 
Groups by returns 
Time-invariant groups by growth rate 0.781 0.805 0.563** 0.696 0.705 0.511*** 
(0.767) (0.783) (0.254) (0.713) (0.737) (0.184) 
Time-variant groups by growth rate 0.0884 -0.0177 -0.0480 -0.222 -0.392 -0.115 
(0.446) (0.466) (0.0608) (0.542) (0.559) (0.0756) 
Groups by risks 
Time-invariant groups by composite  
risk -0.657 -0.400 0.373** -1.581 -1.355 -0.0905 
(1.265) (1.284) (0.183) (1.199) (1.223) (0.226) 
Time-variant groups by composite  risk 1.746** 1.568** 0.181** 1.867** 1.611** 0.191** 
(0.752) (0.769) (0.0789) (0.749) (0.762) (0.0877) 
Regression Probit Probit OLS Probit Probit OLS 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group Contagion No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Lagged ROG's inflow control No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table reports the spillover coefficient β3 in Probit model (13) for 24 different
specifications in columns (1),(2),(4), and (5). Columns (3) and (4) report the results from
the linear probability model with country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at
country level in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The second robustness test relates to our measure of inflow restrictions. To see if
the existence of capital flow deflection relies on the use of the Schindler index of inflow
controls, we use four alternative proxies of capital controls. The first two proxies,
called CAPIN and CAPITAL, come from the work of Quinn et al. (2009). CAPIN
measures capital account restrictions imposed on non-residents. CAPITAL captures
capital account restrictions on both residents and non-residents. The third proxy, called
FINCONT2, gives financial sector specific controls and comes from the work of Ostry
et al. (2012). 29 As both CAPITAL and FINCONT2 represent general capital controls
29The data for the CAPITAL index cover restrictions imposed on capital flows by residents and by
nonresidents. FINCONT2 is computed as an average of three components: (i) differential treatment
of accounts held by nonresidents; (ii) limits on borrowing from abroad; and (iii) restrictions on main-
tenance of accounts abroad. The correlation between the various indexes is reported in Appendix. We
rescale all proxies along the interval [0, 1] with 0 indicating full capital account liberalization, so they
are comparable to the Schindler’s index of inflow controls. The pairwise correlations of these proxies
are provided in Table 10 in the Appendix.
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that include restrictions on both inflows and outflows, the last proxy we consider is the
Schindler’s index of general capital controls.30
We replicate the same regressions as in Tables 5 with these variables. The results
are reported in Table 7, where each row reports the coefficients for τS
−i
t in equation
(11) in the time-variant group. Due to data availability, we have a smaller sample. As
for the regressions with the Schindler index, there is no spillover effect when we do not
divide countries into groups. However, once we divide countries into groups based on
(time-variant) risks, we find evidence of capital flow deflection in most specifications as
in Table 5.
Table 7. Within-Group Spillover Effects of Inflow Control on Gross Inflows:
Using Other Proxies of Capital Controls
Gross%i ﬂow%and%other%m asures%of%
cap%con r l%
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAPIN 12.547*** 13.114*** 5.060 13.130** 13.092** 5.221 
(4.314) (4.263) (3.815) (5.553) (5.567) (4.671) 
CAPITAL 12.383*** 13.055*** 7.840** 10.928*** 11.000*** 5.999 
(3.442) (3.508) (3.264) (4.054) (4.068) (3.643) 
FINCONT2 6.550* 8.958** 6.264** 9.842*** 10.704*** 9.360*** 
(3.238) (3.490) (2.937) (3.590) (3.493) (3.190) 
Schindler's General Control 8.335** 6.077* 0.694 10.030** 8.436* 4.008 
(3.745) (3.572) (2.586) (4.619) (4.378) (3.643) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group Contagion No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Lagged ROG's inflow control No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table reports the spillover coefficient β3 in regression equation (11) with CAPIN ,
CAPITAL, FINCONT2, and Schindler’s index of general control as proxies for capital con-
trols. Due to the data availabilities of CAPIN , CAPITAL, and FINCONT2, the samples
for regressions associated with these proxies are much smaller than the one for regressions with
Schindler index, so we divide the countries into two groups based on composite risk for those
regression analyses. The Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Finally, we also undertake a number of additional robustness tests.31 First, to see if
30Another commonly used proxy for capital controls comes from Chinn and Ito (2009). However this
measure is less refined than the Schindler index and the other measures used here. Specifically, the
Chinn-Ito index is compiled from a broader set of policies than capital controls: they include exchange
rate policy, trade policy, and current account policy. As this measure is less appropriate to test our
theory, we are not surprised to find no robust capital flow deflection when we proxy capital controls
with the Chinn-Ito index. For more discussions on and detailed comparisons of various proxies of
capital controls refer to Quinn et al. (2011).
31The findings of these exercises are not reported here, but are available upon request. All the
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the consistent finding of spillover effects among risk groups depends on the composite
risk measure, we consider other measures of country risk. In particular, we divide
countries based on their index values of law and order and we still continue to find
robust capital flow deflection. Second, we use other proxies for returns. Specifically,
we divide countries by return on assets, return on equities, and short term treasury
bond yields. The sample is smaller as coverage for these variables is more limited. In
any event, we do not find evidence of capital flow deflection across groups of countries
with similar returns with any of these proxies.32 Last, we replace the inflow controls
by general capital controls, which is the average of inflow controls and outflow controls
and redo the regressions in Table 5. Capital flow deflection still holds. This finding is
consistent with an interpretation of the signaling story in Bartolini and Drazen (1997)
that international investors may interpret tighter outflow controls as a signal for future
tighter inflow controls.
3.2.5 Endogeneity
To address possible endogeneity bias, we follow an instrumental variables approach
to estimate specification (11). Omitted variables may be a concern as countries can
experience a surge in inflows because of a common shock to the group. If some coun-
tries react to the surge by increasing their controls while others do not, we can find a
correlation between the policy of the first and the inflow surge to the latter, but this
correlation would not reflect a causal relationship. Furthermore, reverse causality may
also be a concern as the rest of the group might see higher capital inflows to a member
as a signal of a capital inflow surge to the entire group. If this is the case, the rest of
the group may respond to inflows to country i by increasing contemporaneous capital
inflow restrictions. For these reasons, we generate three instruments that are correlated
with the capital controls in the rest of the groups but not with the capital inflows to
country i, and use shocks to these variables to identify the effect on inflows to i.
The first instrument is based on the electoral cycle, as governments may be more
willing to raise capital controls before elections in an attempt to depreciate the real
exchange rate and improve competitiveness. This instrument, denoted by electS
−i
t , is
the GDP weighted fraction of the countries belonging to the subset S−i that have an
election in the upcoming year. This variable is computed as
electS
−i
t =
∑
j∈S−i y
j
t elect
j
t+1∑
j∈S−i y
j
t
,
regressions in this subsection are robust when we deduct FDI from gross inflows.
32The full list of the different ways we grouped countries by return is: (i) Return on assets from
bank-level data; (ii) Return on equity from bank-level data; (iii) Government bond yield; (iv) Stock
market return. In addition, we also ran regressions dividing countries by GDP per capita (a proxy for
the level of development) and GDP (a proxy for the country size). As discussed in the main text, we
found no significant capital flow deflection using these variables.
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where electjt+1 equals 1 if country j has an election in year t+ 1, and 0 otherwise.
The second instrument is based on the content of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), as
in certain cases they may include provisions on the liberalization of the capital account
(WTO, 2011). Specifically, ”deep” FTA (i.e. agreements going beyond preferential
tariffs and covering numerous non-tariff areas of a regulatory nature) involving EU,
US and Japan as signatories generally contain enforceable rules that restrict the use of
capital controls. The instrument, denoted by FTAS
−i
t , is the GDP weighted-fraction of
countries that signed a deep FTA with EU, US, or Japan. The variable is computed as
FTAS
−i
t =
∑
j∈S−i y
j
tFTA
t
t∑
j∈S−i y
j
t
,
where FTAtt equals 1 if country j has a deep FTA with EU, US, or Japan in year t,
and 0 otherwise.33
The third instrument is based on the political leaning of the ruling government,
as the right-wing governments are generally found to be less likely to employ capital
controls (Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1997, and Ghosh et al., 2014), possibly for ideological
reasons. This instrument, denoted as rightS
−i
t , is the GDP weighted fraction of countries
with a right-wing government. The variable is computed as
rightS
−i
t =
∑
j∈S−i y
j
t right
t
t∑
j∈S−i y
j
t
,
where righttt equals to 1 if country j has a right-wing government in year t, and 0 if it
has a left-wing or a centrist government.34
The results for the IV specification when countries are grouped by (time-variant)
risk are reported in Table 8.35 As discussed above, we expect that our instruments are
correlated with inflow restrictions in group S−i, but that they do not directly affect the
dependent variable, as there is no a priori reason why the electoral cycle, the political
color or the FTA participation of countries in the same group as country i are directly
33Data on deep FTAs are from the WTO’s database on the content of trade agreements. See WTO
(2011) for a detailed description. A possible concern with this instrument is that deep FTAs are
correlated with FDI flows to member countries. In particular, Orefice and Rocha (2013) document
the two way relationship between deep agreements and production networks. While to the best of our
knowledge there is no evidence that deep FTAs affect FDIs to third countries (a sort of investment
diversion), one may still worry that the exclusion restriction is not satisfied with respect to FDIs. For
this reason, we run our regressions both including and excluding FDIs from the definition of gross
inflows. All results discussed below do not change.
34The data on election year and the government’s political orientation are from World Bank’s
Database of Political Institutions.
35Due to the data restriction, we have smaller samples for IV regressions. Hence we divide countries
into three groups instead. The results in Table 5 continue to hold when countries are divided into
three groups.
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associated with capital inflows to i. In fact, the first stage results have the expected
sign and the F-statistic of the regression indicates that none of the instruments is
weak. Specifically, the upcoming election instrument is positive and significant, while
the deep FTA and right-wing government instruments are negative and significant.
The second stage regression results show that the capital controls in the rest of the
group still have a positive impact on capital flows to country i and the size of the
coefficients is comparable to the main regressions. When we use upcoming elections
and deep FTAs as instruments, we find stronger significance, possibly due to the smaller
sample of countries for which we have information regarding the political leaning of the
government.36
3.3 Evidence of Policy Response
In this subsection we analyze the empirical evidence of policy responses to capital
flow deflection (Proposition 3). In particular, we use a probit model to investigate
whether the probability of imposing capital inflow restrictions in one country is affected
by capital controls set by other countries.
There is little empirical literature on the determinants of capital controls. Fratzcher
(2011) studies capital controls largely in the context of more industrialized economies.37
Fernandez et al. (2013) investigate whether countries use capital controls for prudential
reasons and focus only on the cyclical components of these measures. Due to the lack
of established empirical literature in the field, we study the determinants of a country’s
decision to change capital inflow controls using a parsimonious empirical model with
the pull-push factors that are found to affect capital inflows in the previous section,
complemented by additional controls suggested by the theory in Section 2 and by other
studies on capital controls. Our specification is:
Pr(Incit = 1) = Φ(β0 + β1∆τ
S−i
t + β2x
i
t + u
i
t), (14)
where Incit is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if country i raises inflow restrictions
at time t and 0 otherwise.38 Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function. ∆τS
−i
t =
τS
−i
t − τS−it−1 is a measure of the change in inflow restrictions by countries in group
S−i, excluding country i. As indicated above, xt includes the pull and push factors
in the previous subsection. These factors may be important determinants of a change
36We also run the IV regression with the combination of rightS
−i
t and FTA
S−i
t as instruments.
However, we find this combination to be significant only at 11 percent and, therefore, we do not report
the results in Table 8.
37We tried using the specifications in Fratzcher (2011) to study capital controls in developing coun-
tries, but the model yields little explanatory power.
38As countries are more likely to increase controls on destabilizing/short-term inflows such as bond
inflows rather than FDIs, we run the same regressions in this subsection excluding FDI restrictions
from the dependent variable, and the results are the same.
31
Table 8. IV: Within-group Spillover Effects of Inflow Controls on Gross Inflows for
Time-Variant Groups by Composite Risk
IV#
#
  (1) (2) 
Second Stage   
Rest of the Group's Inflow Control 10.750*** 8.424* 
(4.035) (4.906) 
First Stage 
Upcoming Election Instrument 0.0886*** 0.185*** 
(0.0205) (0.0381) 
Trade Agreement Instrument -0.298*** 
(0.0224) 
Right-Wing Government Instrument -0.291*** 
(0.0399) 
First Stage F statistics for the instruments 74.590 16.002 
P-value of F statistics 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J statistics 0.201 0.449 
P-value of Hansen J statistics 0.654 0.503 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Group Contagion Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Observations 879 450 
Countries 68 35 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
in capital inflow restrictions as they influence gross capital inflows, which in turn may
trigger a policy response by the government. In addition xit includes time fixed effects,
group contagion variable, and a number of other variables (discussed below) that may
be correlated with a government’s decision to increase inflow restrictions.
The key variable of interest in this subsection is ∆τS
−i
t . Proposition 3 predicts that
whether capital controls are complements or substitutes depends on the motive for
which they are used. If inflow restrictions are motivated by a desire to manipulate the
domestic interest rate, such as in the case of prudential capital controls, then the country
will respond to an increase in inflow restrictions by other borrowers by raising its own
controls. On the other hand, when the motive for capital controls is to manipulate the
world interest rate, then the nature of the relationship among capital controls imposed
by different borrowing countries is ambiguous. As small countries cannot influence the
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world interest rate, they only have domestic motives to use capital controls. We then
expect the coefficient of ∆τS
−i
t to be positive for small economies and ambiguous for
large economies.
We also introduce in our specification a number of variables that may affect the
decision of a government to increase capital controls, either to manipulate the world
interest rate or to manipulate the domestic interest rate. Specifically, we control for the
real GDP since the model in Section 2 predicts that larger countries are more likely to
manipulate the inter-temporal terms of trade with their capital control policies. While
developing economies play a small role in international financial markets relative to
advanced economies, it is still possible that certain larger countries exert at least some
market power if markets are segmented, for instance because various economies are
perceived to be imperfect substitutes by international investors. We also include REER
(real effective exchange rate) overvaluation, domestic inflation, a flexible exchange rate
regime dummy, and external debt since these variables may affect the decision to use
capital controls as a means to manipulate the domestic interest rate for prudential
reasons or for other non-prudential reasons.
Table 9 reports the results of the probit regression (14) when countries are grouped
following the approach of the previous subsection. Due to data availability of inflation
and de facto exchange rate regime, our sample size now reduces to 64.39 The probit
model has a reasonable good fit as indicated by the Pseudo R-squares. To save space,
we do not report the coefficients of the traditional pull factors that are not significant
in any specification.
We find no evidence of within-group policy response as all the coefficients of ∆τS
−i
t
are insignificant. This is true regardless of how we group countries: notably, this is
true when we use risk-groups that display large and significant capital flow deflection.
While our sample is composed of developing countries that are small relative to the size
of the global financial market, one could argue that at least some of these countries are
large within the groups they belong to and set capital controls to exploit this market
power. If this is the case, then the lack of evidence may be resulting from the fact that
capital flow deflection is leading these countries to respond by decreasing rather than
increasing their controls. However, the lack of evidence of a policy response appears
to be a very resilient result. In particular, it persists also if we drop larger developing
economies from the sample to remove possible terms of trade motive (no matter what
definition we give to ”large economy”).
We also undertake a series of robustness tests, none of which changes the finding of
no policy response. First, we use a linear probability model of (14), where we introduce
country fixed effects. The regression results are reported in Table 11 in the Appendix.
Note that several of the control variables that were significant in Table 9 (such as
the REER overvaluation) become insignificant, suggesting that unobserved country
39All the results from the previous subsection on spillover effect are robust to the smaller sample.
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Table 9. Within-Group Policy Response
Table 12. Policy Response: Probit Model of Increase in Inflow Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Expected Sign 
Domestic Variables (Lagged) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.0489* -0.0458* -0.0466* -0.0445* -0.0459* -0.0491* + 
(0.0256) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0242) (0.0249) (0.0252) 
Real GDP growth rate shock  0.0832** 0.0792** 0.0805** 0.0764** 0.0794** 0.0828** - 
(0.0352) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0345) (0.0348) (0.0349) 
REER overvaluation -0.999* -0.940 -0.956* -0.936* -0.920* -0.989* - 
(0.570) (0.577) (0.561) (0.567) (0.555) (0.575) 
Inflation 0.194** 0.184** 0.184** 0.180** 0.177* 0.180* + 
(0.0938) (0.0911) (0.0934) (0.0910) (0.0935) (0.0935) 
Flexible Exchange Rate  -0.0367 -0.0219 -0.0251 -0.0246 -0.0276 -0.0312 - 
(0.155) (0.141) (0.142) (0.144) (0.139) (0.148) 
Real GDP (logged) 0.116** 0.110** 0.114** 0.114** 0.111** 0.111** + 
(0.0472) (0.0467) (0.0476) (0.0472) (0.0481) (0.0472) 
External Debt -0.177 -0.163 -0.165 -0.160 -0.165 -0.172 + 
(0.129) (0.124) (0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.122) 
Change of Weighted Inflow Controls in the ROG 
 
Group by geographic location -1.358 + 
(1.087) 
Group by export specialization 0.664 + 
(0.945) 
Time-invariant group by growth rate -0.123 + 
(1.054) 
Time-variant group by growth rate -0.124 + 
(0.286) 
Time-invariant group by composite risk -1.064 + 
(1.335) 
Time-variant group by composite risk 0.0508 + 
(0.332) 
Observations 841 841 841 841 841 841 
Pseudo R-squared 0.151 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150   
Note: The sample consists of 64 countries. GDP per capita and composite risk index are
insignificant in all specifications and hence not reported in the table to save space. All
regressions control for year fixed effects and group contagion variable. Robust standard errors
clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
characteristics, rather than the time dimension of these variables, are correlated with
the decision to increase inflow restrictions. More importantly for our analysis, the OLS
regression results of the linear probability model yield the same findings as the probit
model, namely the coefficient of ∆τS
−i
t continues to be statistically insignificant for all
country groups.40
As an alternative to the policy change variable ∆τS
−i
t , we use a different definition of
the main control variable and we replicate the results in Tables 9 and 11. In particular,
40We also run instrumental variable regressions replacing ∆τS
−i
t with the sets of instruments intro-
duced in Section 3.2.5, and these regressions yield the same results.
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we define DS
−i
t which is computed as
DS
−i
t =
∑
j∈Si y
j
tD
j
t∑
j∈Si y
j
t
,
where Djt is a categorical variable that takes value 1 if country j tightens inflow control
at t, −1 if j lowers inflow control, and 0 if there is no change. The results are largely
the same, except that we find a policy response within export groups, but it is only
significant at 10%. The coefficient of the main variable of interest for all other groupings
is never significant.
Next, we conduct the same exercises focusing on a decrease (rather than an increase)
in inflow controls as the dependent variable. We rerun the regressions in Tables 9 and
11. Again, we do not find robust within-group policy response.
A final concern is that countries might experience a heterogeneity in externalities
of capital inflows that is not captured by the model. For example, in countries facing
borrowing constraints, the level of capital inflows might be sub-optimally low. In this
case the capital flow deflection would correspond to a positive externality and hence it
would not necessarily induce the government to increase inflow controls. To control for
this, we introduce a dummy for countries that have experienced a recent default and
interact this dummy with the spillover variable. We still do not find evidence of policy
response for countries that have not had a recent default (i.e. for those that are less
likely to face borrowing constraint).41
An important question is what explains the discrepancy between the theory in
Section 2 and the lack of empirical evidence of a policy response in this section. While
we do not have a firm answer to this question, we have three explanations for the puzzle.
A first explanation has to do with the data methodology used to compile de jure indices
of capital controls. These measures capture the extensive margin of restrictions, but not
their intensive margin. In other words, if a regulation or a tax on a certain category of
financial transactions becomes more stringent, this would not necessarily be reflected
in the available indices that code information in a binary form (0 for unrestricted
transactions and 1 for restricted ones).42 This methodology could bias the regression
results as it reduces the variability of capital controls by construction. The second
explanation has to do with the dominant view on capital controls in the historical
period under analysis. Until recently, restrictions to capital flows were not considered
as “legitimate” prudential policies. In this environment, governments may have been
concerned that the use of capital controls could send a negative signal to international
markets, as highlighted in the work of Bartolini and Drazen (1997). In this case,
governments would weigh the benefit of prudential controls to offset domestic market
distortions arising from excessive capital inflows with the reputation costs of introducing
41The results of robustness checks are available upon request.
42See the Appendix for further details.
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such measures. This may also suggest that governments might have preferred the use
of policy instruments other than inflow controls when facing capital flow deflection.
Again, the end result would be a muted policy response. A third explanation is that
governments, or at least some governments, are in practice less likely to use prudential
controls than predicted by the theory, because the problem that they face is a sub-
optimally low level of capital inflows rather than excessively large and volatile flows.
For these countries a sudden surge in inflows as a result of a policy change by others
alleviates an existing market failure. While, as discussed above, we try to address this
concern in our regression, difficulties to access international financial markets may still
contribute to explain the low policy response to capital flow deflection that we find in
the data.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model of capital flow deflection, by which we mean the
increase in capital inflows to third markets as a result of tightening of capital controls
in some countries, and of the policy response that this cross-border spillover effect can
induce in other borrowing countries. We test the implications of the model for a large
sample of developing economies between 1995 and 2009 and find strong evidence of
capital flow deflection, but no evidence of a policy response.
These empirical findings complement recent work on capital controls, which allows
to draw some, admittedly preliminary, conclusions. First, both the event studies on
Brazil (Forbes et al, 2013, and Lambert et al, 2011) and our cross-sectional approach
indicate that capital controls deflect inflows to countries with similar economic char-
acteristics, most notably similar risk structure. This spillover effect is economically
relevant and, when we focus on a change in policy in Brazil, the magnitudes are compa-
rable across studies. These findings indicate that capital controls, even when improving
the management of capital flows to a country, may render more difficult the manage-
ment of flows for others. As discussed in the theory section, these multilateral effects
could lead to an inefficient equilibrium in realistic environments where governments
have limited policy instruments and/or markets are incomplete.
Second, both the studies on the determinants of capital controls (Fratzscher, 2013
and Fernandez et al, 2013) and our results on the policy response cast doubts on the use
of capital controls for prudential reasons. However, this lack of evidence may be driven
by the methodology used to collect cross-country data on inflow restrictions and/or by
the specificity of the historical period under analysis, a period when capital controls were
seen as stigma that governments might have been concerned with sending a negative
signal to markets using capital controls. If this is the case, in the coming years the
changing view on the use of capital controls (IMF, 2012) may well lead governments
to manage capital flows more actively to address domestic distortions. This will also
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increase the frequency of episodes of capital flow deflection and, possibly, of retaliatory
responses as predicted by our theory. Combined with the availability of more detailed
data, future empirical work may provide a different upshot.
In concluding this paper, we would like to come back to the question we posed in the
beginning. What does capital flow deflection imply for the design of the multilateral
institutions needed to govern international capital flows? Ideally, multilateral rules
on capital controls should aim at preserving some flexibility for efficiency enhancing
capital controls, such as prudential controls, while limiting the negative consequences
associated with capital flow deflection.
The regulation of safeguards in the WTO (i.e. the restriction of imports that cause
injury to a country) may provide some useful lessons. Both safeguards and capital
controls introduce valuable flexibility in their respective systems and both lead to de-
flection of trade and capital flows, respectively. But safeguards are tightly regulated
in the WTO. First, they need to be temporary and respectful of the most favored na-
tion (MFN) clause, that is safeguards cannot discriminate between different trading
partners. Second, Art. XIX of GATT and other clauses of the WTO Agreements cir-
cumscribe the situations where a safeguard can rightfully be applied. Third, the use
of safeguards is subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which allows any
member affected by the measure to request that a neutral panel reviews its consis-
tency with WTO rules. Whether this regulatory framework can serve as a source of
inspiration to deal with capital flow deflection is a question left for future research.
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5 Appendix I: Proofs
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Maximizing (4) subject to (5), and taking both market frictions into account -
domestic externality and market power-, we obtain the following Euler equation:
u′(ci1)− βiRu′(ci2)− x′(ci1 − yi1)− βiu′(ci2)(ci1 − yi1)
dR
d[mi(ci1 − yi1)]
= 0. (15)
Let us investigate separately the two distinct motives for policy intervention, starting
with the prudential motive. If country i does not affect the world market equilibrium
(mi = 0), then it is dR/d[mi(ci1−yi1)] = 0. Hence, for a borrowing country (ci1−yi1 > 0),
the Euler equation above simplifies to
u′(ci1) = β
iRu′(ci2) + x
′(ci1 − yi1). (16)
In order for (3) to be equal to (16), it must be
u′(ci1)
βiR(1 + τ i)
=
u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)
βiR
,
from which we obtain the formula for the optimal prudential capital controls as τ̂ i =
x′(ci1 − yi1)/[u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)].
For a lending country (ci1−yi1 ≤ 0) instead, it is e(ci1−yi1) = 0, and thus all frictions
disappear. As a result, the solution to the welfare maximization for a rational forward-
looking national planner coincides with the utility maximization of the representative
consumer, and the optimal prudential policy becomes τ̂ i1 = 0. Hence, depending on
whether country i is lender or borrower, its optimal prudential capital controls can be
described by the step function defined in (9).
Let us now introduce the terms-of-trade motive. If country i is able to affect the
world market equilibrium (mi > 0), then it is dR/d[mi(ci1 − yi1)] 6= 0, and its unilateral
optimal policy is found by equalizing Euler equation (6) with the one solved under
the decentralized optimization problem (3). After a few algebraic steps, we obtain the
optimal policy as
1 + τ i∗ = (1 + τ̂ i)(1 + τ˜ i).
The expression for τ̂ i is given in (9), while the one for τ˜ i is given by τ˜ i = mi · ε−i,
where ε−i represents the inverse elasticity of global savings faced by country i, that is
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(and after defining Y −i1 ≡
∑
j 6=im
jyj1 and C
−i
1 ≡
∑
j 6=im
jcj1):
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ε−i =
dR
d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )
Y −i1 − C−i1
R
. (17)
5.2 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Define
F (R∗, τS
−i
) ≡ mS−i [yS−i1 − cS
−i
1 (R
∗, τS
−i
)] +
∑
j 6=S−i
mj[yj1 − cj1(R∗, τ j1 )] = 0.
as the implicit function of R∗ w.r.t τS
−i
. From the implicit function theorem, we obtain
dR∗
dτS−i
= −∂F/∂τ
S−i
∂F/∂R∗
,
which is strictly negative, as both ∂F/∂τS
−i
and ∂F/∂R∗ are strictly positive.
(ii) World savings are defined as the sum of each individual lending country’s savings,∑
ωm
ω[yω1 − cω1 (R, τω)], with ω indexing all countries for which yω1 − cω1 > 0. The
statement is true given that dcω1 (R, τ
ω)/dR < 0 for any ω.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows immediately from point (i) of Lemma 1 together with the fact that
dci1(R, τ
i)/dR < 0. Formally, dci1(R, τ
i)/dτS
−i
= (dci1(R, τ
i)/dR) · (dR∗/dτS−i) > 0.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Deriving expression (8) with respect to τS
−i
we obtain
dτ i∗
dτS−i
=
dτ̂ i
dτS−i
(1 + τ˜ i) +
dτ˜ i
dτS−i
(1 + τ̂ i),
where τ̂ i, τ˜ i > 0 for a large borrowing country.
43In deriving the expression for ε−i, we exploit the fact that mi(ci1 − yi1) =
∑
j 6=im
j(yj1 − cj1).
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(i) We now prove that dτ̂ i/dτS
−i
is always strictly positive. It is
dτ̂ i
dτS−i
=
dτ̂ i
dR
dR∗
dτS−i
.
Lemma 1 has proven that dR∗/dτS
−i
< 0. We only need to show that dτ̂ i/dR < 0.
Define
G(R, τ̂ i) ≡ x
′(ci1(R, τ̂ i)− yi1)
u′(ci1(R, τ̂ i))− x′(ci1(R, τ̂ i)− yi1)
− τ̂ i = 0
as the implicit function of τ̂ i w.r.t. R when country i is a borrower. By the implicit
function theorem, it is
dτ̂ i
dR
= −∂G/∂R
∂G/∂τ̂ i
.
The numerator writes as
∂G
∂R
=
u′(ci1) · x′′(ci1 − yi1)− u′′(ci1) · x′(ci1 − yi1)
[u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)]2
∂ci1
∂R
,
which is strictly negative, given that u′, x′, x′′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and ∂ci1/∂R < 0.
On the other hand, the denominator can be calculated as
∂G
∂τ̂ i
=
u′(ci1) · x′′(ci1 − yi1)− u′′(ci1) · x′(ci1 − yi1)
[u′(ci1)− x′(ci1 − yi1)]2
∂ci1
∂τ̂ i
− 1,
which is also strictly negative. It then follows dτ̂ i/dR < 0 for all borrowing countries,
which completes the proof of part (i).
(ii) We are now going to prove that dτ˜ i/dτS
−i
may be positive or negative. Knowing
that τ˜ i = mi · ε−i, this derivative can be calculated from the implicit function defined
by
H[τ˜ i, τS
−i
] ≡ miε−i(τ˜ i, τS−i)− τ˜ i = 0.
Applying the implicit function theorem to function H, we obtain
dτ˜ i
dτS−i
= −
dH
dτS−i
dH
dτ˜ i
= − m
i dε−i
dτS−i
mi dε
−i
dτ˜ i
− 1 , (18)
which can be positive or negative. In fact, exploiting the expression for ε−i given in
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(17), we find that
dε−i
dτS−i
=
1
R
[
d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )
dτS−i
>0
(
d2R
d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )2
≶0
Y −i1 − C−i1
R
>0
+
dR
d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )
>0
)− dR
dτS−i
<0
ε−i
>0
] ≶ 0,
and
dε−i
dτ˜ i
=
d2R
d(Y −i1 − C−i1 )dτ˜ i
≶0
− 1
R
ε−i
>0
dR
dτ˜ i
<0
≶ 0.
For ease of reference, the sign of each term is reported in the expression above. The
sign of expression (18) is then ambiguous as both the numerator and the denominator
can be either positive or negative.
5.5 Proof of Corollary
The proof of this statement is immediate given that, as proven in Proposition 3,
dτ̂ i/dτS
−i
= (dτ̂ i/dR)(dR∗/dτS
−i
) > 0.
6 Appendix II: Schindler’s Index
Schindler (2009) compiles de jure indices of inflow and outflow controls using pub-
licly available information from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restriction (AREAER). Schindler (2009) fully exploits the IMF’s post
1996 disaggregated reporting of different categories of capital transaction. The cate-
gories covered in his index are as follows:
• Restrictions on transactions in equities (eq), bonds (bo), money market instru-
ments (mm), and collective investments (ci). Transactions are divided into four
categories:
– Purchase locally by nonresidents (plbn)
– Sale or issue abroad by residents (siar)
– Purchase abroad by residents (pabr)
– Sale or issue locally by nonresidents (siln)
• Restrictions on financial credits (fc) are divided into two categories:
44
– By residents to nonresidents (fco)
– By nonresidents to residents (fci)
• Restrictions on direct investment (di) are divided into three categories:
– Outward investment (dio)
– Inward direct investment (dii)
– Liquidation of direct investment (ldi)
The information contained in the AREAER is coded in binary form, taking a value
of 0 (unrestricted) or 1 (restricted). The data can be aggregated in different ways,
allowing the construction of capital control sub-indices by asset category, by residency,
and by the direction of flows. Sub-indices are aggregated by taking unweighted averages
of the subcategories of interest. Indices for outflow controls are constructed for each
individual asset category. For example:
inflow controls on asset category i (kaii) =
iplbn + isiar
2
where i stands for equities, money market instruments, bonds, or collective investment
instruments. The aggregate inflow control (kai) is
kai =
kaieq + kaimm + kaibo + kaici + fci+ dii
6
.
7 Appendix III: Additional Tables
Table 10. Pairwise Correlation of Different Proxies of Capital Controls
Correla'on)between))
measures)of)controls)
  Schindler Inflow Schindler General  CAPITAL CAPIN FINCONT2 
Schindler Inflow 1.000 
Schindler General  0.936 1.000 
CAPITAL 0.734 0.802 1.000 
CAPIN 0.728 0.782 0.934 1.000 
FINCONT2 0.519 0.534 0.497 0.464 1.000 
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Table 11. Within-group Policy Response with Borrowing Constraint
Linear probit 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Expected 
Sign 
Domestic Variables (Lagged) 
Real GDP growth rate -0.00171 -0.000935 -0.00201 -0.00134 -0.00125 -0.00203 + 
(0.00799) (0.00803) (0.00783) (0.00768) (0.00771) (0.00810) 
Real GDP growth rate shock  0.0101 0.00907 0.0100 0.00901 0.00930 0.0101 - 
(0.00946) (0.00945) (0.00944) (0.00911) (0.00932) (0.00969) 
REER overvaluation -0.0345 -0.0248 -0.0288 -0.0282 -0.0348 -0.0370 - 
(0.140) (0.147) (0.140) (0.143) (0.140) (0.142) 
Inflation 0.0508 0.0523 0.0502 0.0504 0.0497 0.0510 + 
(0.0403) (0.0393) (0.0412) (0.0405) (0.0420) (0.0416) 
Flexible Exchange Rate  -0.250*** -0.211*** -0.229*** -0.226*** -0.213*** -0.221*** - 
(0.0404) (0.0338) (0.0303) (0.0282) (0.0302) (0.0360) 
Real GDP (logged) 0.00209 -0.0455 -0.0862 -0.0759 -0.0861 -0.0678 + 
(0.367) (0.366) (0.376) (0.369) (0.370) (0.369) 
External Debt -0.0226 -0.0125 -0.0169 -0.0160 -0.0175 -0.0187 + 
(0.0359) (0.0381) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0369) (0.0371) 
Change of Weighted Inflow Controls in the ROG 
 
Group by geographic location -0.278 + 
(0.236) 
Group by export specialization 0.0747 + 
(0.171) 
Time-invariant group by growth rate -0.0610 + 
(0.230) 
Time-variant group by growth rate -0.0244 + 
(0.0560) 
Time-invariant group by composite risk -0.207 + 
(0.259) 
Time-variant group by composite risk 0.0189 + 
(0.0766) 
Observations 841 841 841 841 841 841 
R-squared 0.168 0.167 0.165 0.166 0.168 0.166   
Note: The sample consists of 64 countries. GDP per capita and composite risk index are
insignificant in all specifications and hence not reported in the table to save space. All
regressions control for year fixed effects, group contagionvariables, and country fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
46
